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M
any economies, during the early stages of monetary development,
experienced what appear to be sporadic relative shortfalls of small
denomination means of payment. These episodes have been
broadly documented in the literature under the label of “shortages of small
change.” Sargent and Velde (2002), for example, review in great detail the
evidence for Europe. Hanson (1979) provides an interesting survey of the
evidence for the British colonies in NorthAmerica. The purpose of this paper
istopresentevidenceofsimilareventsoccurringintheearlymonetaryhistory
ofArgentina.
The provision of small change in modern economies has become almost
a nonissue.1 In ﬁat money systems, the monetary authority controls the ag-
gregate supply of monetary balances (of all denominations) and stands ready
to exchange at par any denomination for an equivalent amount of any other
denomination. It is, then, demand that determines the relative amounts of the
different denominations that circulate in the economy. There are, of course,
costs of providing the demanded amounts. Low-denomination coins tend to
berelativelymorecostlytoproduce(atleast,perunitofvalue). Yet,ingeneral,
governments in modern societies have considered these costs worthwhile.
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1 Some high-inﬂation economies sometimes experience imbalances in their denomination struc-
ture, resulting in relative scarcity of small change. The monetary authority becomes reluctant to
provide large quantities of low-denomination means of payment, which are relatively costly to
produce and, due to high inﬂation, have a short useful lifespan.
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Underacommoditymoneysystemitisalsopossible,inprinciple,tosolve
the problem of the relative supply of denominations. Basically, it requires is-
suing token coins that can be readily exchanged at par with the monetary
authority for full-bodied coins.2 This monetary arrangement is commonly
known as the “standard formula” (see Sargent and Velde 2002, 5). For some
time, the production of token coins represented a signiﬁcant technological
challenge. Since token coins are worth more than their intrinsic value, coun-
terfeiting is a very proﬁtable activity under the “standard formula” system.
To avoid counterfeiting, the coins need to be fairly sophisticated, which in-
creases their production cost. In the history of monetary systems, before the
technology for production of coins was well developed, token coins were at
best a very imperfect solution to the problem of small change.
When all coins are full-bodied coins, as was the case in SpanishAmerica,
the potential for mismatches on the demand and supply of denominations
becomes more likely. The minting cost per value is normally lower for high-
denominationcoins. Totheextentthatcoinscirculateatparvalue(i.e.,without
discounts), there are incentives to mint only high-denomination coins. The
historical record on the shortages of small change is the story of monetary
authorities that struggled to sustain the proper mix of (full-bodied) high- and
low-denomination coins.
Imperfect private solutions to the shortage problem are possible. For ex-
ample, coins could be cut in portions to circumvent the indivisibility barrier.
Also, smallchangecanbeofferedatapremium. However, allthesepartialso-
lutions bring forth the problems that arise when high- and low-denomination
coins do not exchange in convenient and ﬁxed ratios. These issues are most
relevantincaseswheretheneedforsmallchangeoriginatesindomestictrans-
actions. Systematic negotiation over discounts and measurement of effective
coin weight, in this case, involve very low-value amounts, most likely not
worth the trouble.
In Search of a Formal Deﬁnition
Providing a precise theoretical deﬁnition of a shortage of small change is
no simple matter. Sargent and Velde (1999; 2002) consider a model where
low-denominationmoneycanbeusedfor“small”and“large”transactionsbut
high-denominationmoneycanonlybeusedfor“large”transactions. Theythen
deﬁne a “shortage” as a situation where the agents in the economy have to
adjusttheirconsumptionpatterntotheirholdingsoflow-denominationmoney
while, at the same time, holding an “excess” stock of the high-denomination
2A full-bodied coin is one that has metallic content worth as much as the coin’s face value.
Token coins are subsidiary coins that have lower intrinsic value than the value at which they can
be exchanged with the monetary authority for full-bodied coins.H. M. Ennis: The Problem of Small Change 95
money. In other words, at the time of consumption decisions, the agent’s
holdings of low-denomination money act as a binding constraint (see Rolnick
and Weber [2003] for a good summary).





effectively more useful in transactions than high-denomination money. How-
ever, both monies are being voluntarily held by agents. For this situation
to be an equilibrium, the low-denomination money has to be losing value
with respect to the high-denomination money. In other words, while low-





ing the difﬁculty of carrying out trade in the face of a sudden disappearance
of some kinds of coins.” However, in Sargent and Velde’s model, agents are
“freely choosing quantities while taking prices as given,” and “nothing in the
model looks like a shortage or a disruption of trade.”
Wallace goes on to discuss what is, in his view, at the heart of the problem
of small change. He starts by specifying the four desirable properties of a
medium of exchange: portability, divisibility, durability, and recognizability;
and he describes the history of coinage as “mainly about the technological
difﬁculties of achieving a full-bodied coinage system that comes close to
having those attributes.” Formal economic analyses that explicitly model all
four attributes of a medium of exchange and study the denomination structure
of money are not readily available. Wallace (2003) provides an introduction
to the formal treatment of these matters within the framework provided by
the random matching models of money pioneered by Kiyotaki and Wright
(1989).4 He discusses how the indivisibility of coins, for example, could limit
the set of transactions that agents undertake and how such limitations would
clearly be perceived as shortages of small change by the agents in the model.
These are interesting theoretical avenues that should eventually improve our
understanding of the historical records.
The objective of this article is not to answer the theoretical questions
that surround the issue of the appropriate provision of small change. Those
3 Sargent and Velde (2002) do, in fact, ﬁnd some supporting evidence for this hypothesis in
their review of the historical record of many European countries. Unfortunately, as we will later
see, such an evaluation is not possible with the data available for the colonial period in South
America.
4 See also Wallace and Zhou (1997) and Lee, Wallace, and Zhu (2005).96 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
are difﬁcult questions that involve theoretical concepts that are not yet well
understood in the literature and require much further study. Here, instead, we
will limit ourselves to reviewing the historical evidence that indicates that the
availability of small change was a problem around the turn of the 18th century
in the region that is today Argentina. As noted above, similar evidence is
available for other parts of the world. However, in view of the intricate nature
of the problem involved, it seems important to collect and analyze as much
evidence as possible on this matter.
A Caveat
Before turning to the main subject of the article, a general clariﬁcation is in
order. When reading the historical records, one has to be especially careful in
differentiating the scarcity of means of payment from the general scarcity of
resources prevailing in the area. The confusion between those two different
phenomena was common at the time (for example, ofﬁcial resolutions would
sometimesassociatethegeneralscarcityofresourceswiththeinabilitytoissue
coins).5 The territory of Argentina was relatively poor at the end of the 18th
and the beginning of the 19th centuries and it relied on imports from Europe
for many essential needs. Furthermore, the recurrent military conﬂicts at the
beginning of the 1800s only contributed to further reducing the availability
of economic resources. But the general stringency of resources is not the
subject of this article. Instead, I intend to report evidence that suggests that
the relative scarcity of certain means of payment, and in particular fractional
money, constituted a problem in itself.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In the next section, I
discusstheevidencefrom1776tothe1810Revolution,thatis,thelatterpartof
the colonial period. Classic manifestations of the scarcity of small change ap-
pear in this period: attempts by the government to ban the export of fractional
money;extremedifﬁcultiesinpersuadingthepopulationtoremintlow-quality,
low-denominationcoins; andthedevelopmentofimperfectsubstitutesforuse
in payment of small transactions are among the main ones being reviewed. In
Section 2, I present evidence that suggests that the shortage of small change
continued to be a problem during the 15 years after the revolution. I explain
how the government struggled with the decision to issue copper coins for 10
years, and how it ﬁnally injected the coins in 1823 with great initial success.
Also, in 1822 the ﬁrst bank in the region was created and allowed to issue
notes of moderate denominations after some initial reluctance. I discuss the
genesis of that decision in some detail. To conclude, in Section 3, I provide
5 Supple (1957, 244–45) reports that this kind of confusion was also common in 17th century
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some further discussion of the economic issues highlighted by the evidence
discussed.
1. EVIDENCE FROM THE PERIOD OF THE VICEROYALTY
OF THE RIO DE LA PLATA
Spanish settlers were in the area that is todayArgentina since the mid-1500s.
For the early colonial period, the available evidence indicates that there was
no widespread monetary exchange occurring in the region and that instead
barterwasthepredominantwayofexchange(Prebisch1921, 193; El´ ıa1942a,
416). Since the beginning of colonization, Spain implemented a system of
internationaltraderestrictionsinthecolonies. TheportofBuenosAirescould
only trade with Spain and such trade was subject to heavy taxation. These
restrictions signiﬁcantly slowed down economic development for more than
two hundred years. Only in 1776, with the creation of the Viceroyalty of the
Rio de la Plata, the representative of the king,Viceroy Ceballos, declared free
trade in the port of Buenos Aires.6 As a result, a signiﬁcant increase in the
level of internal and external trade took place in Buenos Aires and its area of
inﬂuence.
Duringmostoftheearlycolonialperiod, BuenosAiresmaintainedatrade
deﬁcit with Spain. This deﬁcit resulted in a constant outﬂow of gold and
silver (in the form of coins, bars, and silverware).7 Coins came to Buenos
Aires from the regions of Upper Peru (the area occupied today by Bolivia and
Peru). The Royal Villa of Potos´ ı was the major center of economic activity
in Upper Peru, with its adjacent silver mines and the regional mint house.
Smuggling of European linen and relatively inexpensive Brazilian products
was common in the port of Buenos Aires. Most of these products were sent
to Upper Peru to be sold in exchange for gold and silver coins. The proceeds,
especially high-quality coins, were then exported to Europe via BuenosAires.
TheconstantoutﬂowofcoinsfromtheportofBuenosAireswasperceived
ascreatingsigniﬁcantliquidityproblemsintheareaoftheRiodelaPlata(El´ ıa
1942a, 420–21). For example, as a result of numerous local complaints, in
October1618theKingofSpainpassedaresolutionallowingthesecoloniesto
use “products of the land” (instead of gold and silver coins) to pay the “Indies
taxes” (El´ ıa 1942a, 418).8 Interestingly, there is very similar evidence of
6 Before 1776, the colonies of the Rio de la Plata were under the control of the representative
of the king residing in the Peruvian area.
7 Halper´ ın Donghi (1972, 48) reports that exports of gold and silver from Buenos Aires
amounted to about 80 percent of total exports in 1796.
8Also, in 1622, in an attempt to stop the outﬂow of precious metals from Upper Peru, the
Spanish Crown created the customs of C´ ordoba, an inland post that was supposed to control all
trade between the port of Buenos Aires and the highland regions in the northwest (Upper Peru).
The effectiveness of this measure was undermined by rampant smuggling.98 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
perceivedshortagesofspecieincolonialCanadaattheendofthe18thcentury.
Redish (1984) argues that these common complaints about a general scarcity
of specie in Canada should really be interpreted as reﬂecting the discomfort
of merchants with what was actually a scarcity of high-quality coins. Redish
provides evidence indicating that most of the coins in circulation in late 1700s
Canadawereoldcoinswhoseweighthadbeenreducedbyintentionalclipping
or sweating (and the normal wear and tear of very old coins), i.e., low-quality
coins. The idea behind Redish’s interpretation is that, in accordance with
modern versions of Gresham’s Law, low-quality coins tended to drive high-
quality coins out of circulation.9
In principle, it seems that Redish’s hypothesis could be applicable for
interpreting the complaints about general scarcity of specie during the early
colonial period of Argentina. However, more research is needed in this area
beforereachingamoredeﬁniteconclusion. Here, though, thefocuswillbeon
tryingtoidentifysituationswheretheshortagecouldbeassociatedexclusively
tolow-denominationmediaofexchange,andIwillrestrictmystudytoonlythe
latter part of the colonial period (that is, since the creation of the Viceroyalty
of the Rio de la Plata in 1776).
The Monetary System
The foundations of the monetary system in the Viceroyalty of the Rio de la
Plata resembled those of the system in place in Spain at the time. Basically,
there were in circulation gold and silver coins minted in Spain, Mexico, and
Peru. The two main mints in the Spanish colonies of South America were
located in Lima and Potos´ ı. Most of the coins circulating in the territories of
the Rio de la Plata (todayArgentina) were silver coins minted in Potos´ ı (El´ ıa
1942a, 429).
ThePotos´ ımintwasunderthedirectcontroloftheSpanishCrown, which
held a monopoly for issuing coins. Mining, on the other hand, was a private
enterprise. The Crown, though, provided miners with most of the essential
inputs and heavily taxed their production. One of the most notorious institu-
tions of the time was the mita, an annual recruitment of forced Indian labor
thatwasassignedtothedifferentminersaccordingtoasystemofconcessions.
In 1779 the Spanish Crown created the Banco de San Carlos that provided
creditandotherbasicinputstominersinPotos´ ıandmonopolizedthepurchase
9 Sargent and Velde (2002, 125) discuss the “bullion famine” of medieval Europe in the
context of their model and also conclude that talking about general shortages of coins is difﬁcult
to rationalize. Instead, they maintain that the monetary anomalies involved were the consequences
of shortages of small change.H. M. Ennis: The Problem of Small Change 99
Figure 1 Silver Pesos Minted in Potos´ ı Between 1767–1770
Source: http://www.historiadelpais.com.ar/
of silver in the region (Tandeter 1992, 198–99). The diezmo, a 10 percent tax,
was charged on all silver production.
The mint issued coins according to general orders from the Spanish
Crown.10 The relative supply of different denominations of coins was in
principle determined by directives from Spain and decisions by the mint’s ad-
ministrators (part of the Crown’s bureaucracy). Under this scheme the supply
of fractional money, in principle, did not automatically adjust to its demand,
and imbalances became common.11 During the second half of the 18th cen-
tury, a system of two-year concessions was instituted for the administration of
the mints on behalf of the Crown. The concession contracts stipulated targets
for the cost of production and the proportion of fractional money to be minted
(Dargent Chamot 2005, Ch. 15).
Thereweretwotypesofsilvercoinsincirculationatthetimeofthecreation
of the Viceroyalty: the coins called de cordoncillo and the older, hammered
coins (or cobs) called macuquina. The coin de cordoncillo had the edges
marked to prevent clipping and the macuquina had variations in thickness,
weight, and shape, making it a coin of mediocre quality. The macuquina
had been in circulation since the time when hammering was the common
minting practice (in Potos´ ı, from 1575 until 1773). In principle, both coins de
cordoncillo and macuquina of all existing denominations were in circulation.
10 Romano (1998, 133) reports that the original 16th century royal ordinances creating the
mints in Mexico and Peru, including the one in Potos´ ı, stated explicitly the rules for the proportions
of the different denomination of coins to be minted. In particular, only a fourth of the coins were
supposed to be of low denomination. These original orders, though, were not always strictly
followed and changed over time.
11 In an alternative scheme called “free minting,” private agents holding silver or gold are
able to go to the mint and exchange their metal for coins of the denomination of their choice.
This scheme was predominant in Europe (see Sargent and Velde 2002, 20).100 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 1 Silver Coins—Main Denominations
Cuartillo 1/4 real
Medio Real 1/2 real
Real
Real de a Dos 2 reals
Medio Peso 4 reals
Peso 8 reals
However,ahighproportionofthestockofcirculatinglow-denominationcoins
were macuquina, as these were the coins that had been minted for a longer
period of time.12
The high-denomination, full-bodied silver coins were commonly called
plata doble and the low-denomination coins, plata sencilla (Bonura 1992,
40; Tandeter 1992, 157). Most plata sencilla was of the macuquina type
and not full-bodied (due to intentional clipping and the normal wear and tear
resulting from their use and age). The plata doble, on the other hand, were
mostly high-quality, full-bodied silver coins that were relatively scarce and
especially useful for payments of imported goods from Spain.
In terms of the denomination structure, the main denominations were the
peso, also called peso fuerte and the real with a nominal value of one-eighth
of the peso. There were also coins of half, two, and four reals (El´ ıa 1942a,
432). Cuartillos, coins of one-fourth of a real, were only minted in Potos´ ı
after 1794 and in very small quantities (Dargent Chamot 2005, Ch. 17).
Gold coins were very scarce in the area and of relatively high purchasing
power. The most common gold coin was the doubloon of eight, which was
equivalent to approximately 16 silver pesos and was mostly used for interna-
tionaltradeandhoarding. Overall, goldcoinswerenotusedinsmalldomestic
transactions, and for this reason they play no major role in the discussion that
follows.
In 18th century Spain, small change was partly provided by the issu-
ing of vell´ on, a low-denomination coin made with a mixture of copper and
small quantities of silver. According to Bonura (1992, 39–40), the vell´ on did
not circulate in the region of the Rio de La Plata (see also, Cort´ es Conde
and McCandless 2001, 384). These token coins were not commonly minted
in Potos´ ı, probably because of their high minting costs and an alleged (yet,
somewhat surprising) reluctance of the general population to accept them in
exchange. Interestingly, Romano (1998, 133) reports extensively on a similar
12 Low-denomination coins were minted in relatively low proportions and, hence, most of
the stock in circulation was fairly old. High-denomination coins were minted more intensively and
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phenomenon taking place in colonial Mexico (see also Hamilton 1944, 35).
The reason for this phenomenon, however, is not yet well understood.13
The Problem of Small Change
On several occasions between 1770 and 1810, the local elites complained
to the Crown about the shortage of small change. In 1773 the king, partly
as an attempt to deal with the scarcity of small change, banned any export
of fractional money from the colonies. Speciﬁcally, the king prohibited the
shipment of pieces of half, one, and two reals to Spain and instructed the
Viceroys to intensify their efforts to ensure that the royal mints coin enough
silver in those denominations “for the vast commerce ofAmerica” (Hamilton
1944, 37).14
The macuquina was heavily used in domestic transactions, usually circu-
lating at par value. However, its poor quality complicated its normal use and
generated many complaints among the locals.15 Its irregular shape made the
macuquina very susceptible to clipping, creating uncertainty about its intrin-
sic value. Furthermore, by 1784 all circulating macuquina was at least ten
years old (hammered coins were last produced in Potos´ ı around 1773) and,
hence, in very bad shape. At that time, the king issued an order to collect and
remint all the macuquina in the colonies. After ﬁve years, in 1789 the order
was reissued, allowing for a ﬁxed two-year period to complete the process. In
fact, after those two years, Viceroy Arredondo again postponed the recovery
periodwithnoexplicittimelimit. Thisprocesssuggeststhattheofﬁcialsinthe
colonies were reluctant to enforce the order to remint the macuquina as they
perceived that doing so would only aggravate the shortage of small change.
In fact, during the same period,ViceroyArredondo proposed the creation of a
token coin to be used in domestic trade. He explicitly pointed to the scarcity
ofsmallchangeasajustiﬁcation. TheSpanishCrowndeniedtheproposaland
instead ordered that all mint houses in the area start minting cuartillos (El´ ıa
1942a, 425–26; Dargent Chamot 2005, Ch. 15).
13Vell´ on was issued in colonial Mexico in 1542 and the general population refused to accept
it. The experiment was a complete failure. Hamilton (1944, 36) argues that the vell´ on was so
grossly overvalued that the population preferred to continue using cocoa beans as a mean of pay-
ment. Romano (1998, 134–35), instead, suggests that the local elites actually opposed the issuing
of vell´ on based on political motivations. The reason vell´ on was not issued in the Spanish colonies
in America is an unanswered question in the literature.
14 Butlin (1953, 81–82) reports that the government in Australia (a British colony) used sim-
ilar legal instruments to avoid the export of coins in 1813. Sargent and Velde (2002) report legal
restrictions on the export of coins in medieval England (p. 132) and in Venice on May 1268 (p.
163). See Wallace and Zhou (1997) for a rationalization of this type of ofﬁcial restriction.
15 See Hamilton (1944, 25–26) for an account of similar problems in the area of colonial
Mexico.102 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
The nature of the small change problem was twofold. First, low-
denomination coins (that is, coins of two reals or less) were minted in signif-
icantly smaller proportions than the silver pesos; and second, the purchasing
power of the lowest-denomination coin was very high.16
In terms of the relative amounts of low-denomination coins that were
minted in Potos´ ı, Tandeter (1992, 157) reports that, in the mid-1700s, 85
percent of the minting was done in plata doble (i.e., coins of four reals and
higher). By the same token, Romano (1998, 117) explains that most of the
coins minted in the Spanish colonies inAmerica during the 18th century were
of high denomination, with the eight-real (peso) pieces amounting to at least
95 percent of the annual issues of silver coins both in Mexico and in Peru.17
Dargent Chamot (2005, Ch. 15) reports the reluctance of the Superintendent
ofthemintofPotos´ ıin1784toissuelargequantitiesofcuartillos, considering
them too costly to produce. In general, cuartillos were issued in very limited
amounts, and only later in the period (in Potos´ ı, starting only in 1794).18
One way to get an idea of the high purchasing power of the denomination
structure that was predominant in the region is to compare the value of silver
coinswiththelevelofnominalwagesforunskilledruralworkers. Forexample,
atthetime,aslaveintheruralareasnearBuenosAireswouldnormallyreceive
an allowance of one real per week to buy “soap and tobacco.” A free rural
seasonalworker(apeon)hadanaveragewageofaroundfourpesospermonth
(although monthly wages ﬂuctuated signiﬁcantly across workers, from two
to seven pesos; see Amaral 1987, 267–72). This monthly wage implied a
daily wage of around one-and-a-half reals that amounted to three coins of half
real,whichwaseffectivelythesmallestdenominationcoin. Asimilarsituation
tookplaceintheearlystagesofothermonetarysystems. Forexample,Hanson
(1979, 283) reports that, of the common coins in circulation in Pennsylvania
and Massachusetts (both British colonies) in 1742, the lowest-denomination
coin represented about three days’wages for an unskilled laborer at the time.
Some Consequences
The lack of small-denomination coins resulted in the use of unofﬁcial means
of payment in everyday transactions (Bonura 1992, 40). One of these instru-
ments, the contrase˜ nas, became very popular. Contrase˜ nas were small metal
(tin) discs with the initials of the issuer printed on them (El´ ıa 1942a, 428;
16 Bonura (1992, 39) recognizes the relatively high purchasing power of the cuartillo and
ﬁnds it puzzling that no lower-denomination coins were issued before 1794.
17 The proportion of low-denomination coins in circulation was probably higher since high-
denomination coins were more intensively exported.
18 Starting in 1793, cuartillos were also minted in colonial Mexico. According to Hamilton
(1944, 38), the cuartillos were “too small for convenient use and struck in inadequate quantities”
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Prebisch 1921, 199). In everyday transactions requiring small change that the
parties(buyerandseller)lack, thebuyercouldmakepaymentsintwopossible
ways. One way was to pay using contrase˜ nas previously issued by the partic-
ular merchant participating in the transaction, in which case the transaction
would terminate with the payment. The other way was for the buyer to pay
in high-denomination silver coins. In this case, when necessary, the change
resulting from the transaction would be provided in contrase˜ nas issued by the
seller. Sometimes, even the contrase˜ nas issued by a third party were used as
change. In general, the third party was a well-known merchant in the area and
the individuals engaged in the transaction were holding his contrase˜ nas as a
result of previous transactions.19
The use of contrase˜ nas did not, of course, solve all the problems. In fact,
their extensive use resulted in widespread fraud and falsiﬁcation. Later on,
contrase˜ nas were gradually substituted with private IOUs issued directly on
paper.20 These IOUs were inconvertible and also circulated widely in the
region (Prebisch 1921, 199). They are a precursor of the inconvertible paper
money that was introduced in the region more than a decade after the 1810
Revolution.21
Another way people circumvented the lack of small change was by devel-
oping even simpler credit arrangements. Customers would build up a debit at
the community store until it was possible to settle the payment using higher-
denomination coins that were more readily available (Schmit 2003, 265). Ob-
viously, the use of this kind of informal credit was limited to cases where
the owner of the store was relatively certain that the customer had reasons to
secure a permanent relationship with the store.
The Premium
There is some evidence that in the City of BuenosAires during colonial times,
the hard peso sometimes circulated at a premium over ﬁduciary silver coins,
i.e., the low-denomination, usually not full-bodied plata sencilla (Prebisch
19 In colonial Mexico, it was popular to use for payments small wooden disks with the name
of the issuer (a merchant) printed on them. These disks were called tlacos and they emerged
in response to the recurrent shortages of small change that took place in the Mexican territory
during the 18th century (Romano 1998, 137; Hamilton 1944, 36–38). Tin-made tokens with similar
characteristics as the contrase˜ nas circulated in England in 1576 (Sargent and Velde 2002, 266).
20 Butlin (1953, 26–27) describes privately issued promissory notes that circulated in Australia
during the colonial period and the rampant forgery that originated around them.
21 Hanson (1979, 285) convincingly argues that the origin of paper currency in the colonies
of North America was the result of the persistent shortages of low-denomination coins. He provides
evidence of the issuance of private circulating notes by merchants early in the process. Sargent
and Velde (2002, 203) discuss evidence from 1577 France that documents the widespread use of




the Crown to introduce legal restrictions to abolish “the 3 percent premium
of the hard peso.” In 1798, after the Crown did not respond, the request was
reiterated. The main justiﬁcation for the request was the constant ﬂow of
fractional coins out of Buenos Aires to the interior. The ofﬁcial document
stated that this ﬂow had “reduced the quantity of small-denomination coins,
... creating difﬁculties in the change or reduction of the plata doble to the
sencilla ... the specie so necessary for making small daily purchases, which
are very indispensable transactions” (see Bonura 1992, 41).24
With respect to the evolution of the premium over time, it appears that the
premium was fairly constant. Bonura (1992, 49), for example, reports that the
premium was still around 3 percent in 1812, when the authorities in Buenos
Aires engaged in another legal attempt to reduce it. Sargent andVelde (2002)
associate periods of shortages of small change with periods of depreciation
in the value of fractional money. The evidence from Argentina is too sparse
to test this hypothesis (but, in principle, no clear trend in the premium was
observed in the region).
2. EVIDENCE FROM EARLYARGENTINA
In 1810, the Cabildo (the town council) of Buenos Aires declared autonomy
fromtheSpanishCrown. WiththeendoftheViceroyaltyoftheRiodelaPlata,
BuenosAires lost Upper Peru from its area of inﬂuence; and with Upper Peru,
the mint of Potos´ ı and the silver mines.25
This transitional period was associated with general monetary disarray in
the region. The confrontation with Upper Peru (which had remained loyal
to the Crown) and the necessary ﬁnancing of military expenses (including
signiﬁcantimportsthatneededtobepaidinspecie)createdasharpcontraction
in the amount of available means of payment in BuenosAires (Prebisch 1921,
198). During this period, many government ofﬁcials proposed a compulsory
22 Tandeter (1992, 157) reports that the plata doble had a premium over the plata sencilla in
the Villa of Potos´ ı in the mid-1700s. He attributes the premium to the fact that the plata doble
was the one preferred in long-distance trade.
23 This kind of geographic dispersion in the exchange rate of coins was also observed across
the French territory during the 1570s, a period of monetary “chaos” (Sargent and Velde 2002,
200).
24 In principle, one would expect shortages of small change to be associated with, if anything,
a premium on low-denomination coins. This is the opposite of what is reported here. It seems
likely, however, that the premium was not uniform across transactions, and that the 3 percent
premium on hard pesos was predominant only in large-value transactions and international trade.
25 For a good overview of the economic factors that led to the breakup of the Viceroyalty





The new government made several attempts at issuing new coins during
this period. In 1813, after temporarily recovering the city of Potos´ ı, the ﬁrst
Argentinean coin was minted. A year later, however, the IndependenceArmy
lost Potos´ ı to royal forces and the minting stopped.26 Some minting of silver
pesos took place in the province of C´ ordoba during 1815, but in very limited
amounts (El´ ıa 1942a, 433). At that time, illegal private minting of cobs and
other (very low quality) silver counterfeits was common in the northwest
region of the country (Bonura 1992, 73). In 1817 Governor G¨ uemes ofﬁcially
authorized the circulation of “illegal” coins (after being ofﬁcially stamped) in
theterritoryunderhisjurisdictioninthenorthwestpartofthecountry. Hegave
asajustiﬁcationforthisresolutionthe“evilsassociatedwiththelackofmeans
of payment” (El´ ıa 1942a, 435). A year later, the federal authority banned the
circulation of these “G¨ uemes” coins, establishing a severe punishment for
those who accepted and/or held them. Overall, no real progress was made
in providing the economy with appropriate means of payment during the ﬁrst
decade after the revolution (Bonura 1992, 81).
Besides the general monetary disorder, some speciﬁc episodes suggest
the existence of shortages of fractional money. In this respect, two situations
appear most relevant: the provision of copper coins approved in 1821 after
several years of discussions and the authorization granted to the Bank of
BuenosAires to issue paper notes of relatively low denomination in 1823.27
Copper Coins
InJune1815thenewlycreatedgovernmentinBuenosAiresstartedevaluating
the introduction of “provisional money” in the form of copper coins (Bonura
1992, 61). For this purpose, the government commissioned an extraordinary
consultingbodyofexpertstostudytheissue. Theauthority’smotivationforthe
introduction of these coins was twofold. The ﬁrst was that shortages of small
change were a recurrent problem that needed to be ﬁxed. InAugust 1815 the
body of experts presented a detailed report in which they unanimously agreed
26 Minting of Argentinean coins in Potos´ ı resumed for a short period in 1815.
27 Experiences in other countries inﬂuenced these two decisions. For example, the general
perception in Buenos Aires was that copper coins were being used with great success in Portugal
(Bonura 1992, 77). With respect to banking, reports of the beneﬁts associated with the operation
of the Bank of England were one of the main motivations for the creation of the Bank of Buenos
Aires (Prebisch 1921, 199–200).106 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 2 Copper Coin Minted at Boulton’s Mint
http://www.camoar.gov.ar/CecasProvinciales.htm
thatintroducingcoppercoinswasessentialforeliminatingtheinconveniences
resulting from the persistent lack of small change (Bonura 1992, 65).
The second motivation was the possibility of obtaining extra resources
for a government that was in desperate need of ﬁnancing.28 This issue was
the subject of important disagreement among experts. They discussed the
estimated costs of minting copper coins extensively, but they did not reach an
agreement, so the implementation was postponed (Bonura 1992, 65). Spo-
radically, during the next ﬁve years, the government authorities in Buenos
Aires revisited the possibility of issuing copper coins but never managed to
implement the idea.29
Finally, in October 1821, a law was passed allowing the government to
arrange the minting of 100,000 pesos in copper coins of one-tenth of a real
(El´ ıa 1942a, 437). These coins, the ﬁrst Argentinean copper coins, were
minted in Birmingham, England (at Boulton’s mint). Fifty thousand pesos of
those coins were received and put into circulation in July 1823.30 El´ ıa (1942a,
28 Token coins are usually circulated at a value greater than their intrinsic value. For this
reason, they have the potential to become a source of revenue for the monetary authority. During
1817, the government was evaluating the possibility of opening a mint in the city of C´ ordoba.
After concluding that the project would not be proﬁtable for the government, the idea was aban-
doned. The evidence seems to indicate that there was a problem of insufﬁcient scale of production.
Apparently, the set-up costs of operating a mint were very high, and the quantity of metal avail-
able from the mines of Famatina, the planned source of basic input, was not enough to make the
enterprise proﬁtable (Bonura 1992, 72).
29 The issue of minting copper coins was again extensively discussed in 1818 when the new
government was evaluating the possibility of establishing an ofﬁcial mint in Buenos Aires (Bonura
1992, 75).
30 To put some perspective on these numbers, note, for example, that in 1923 total tax
revenue for the province of Buenos Aires was around two million pesos (see Bordo and Vegh 2002,H. M. Ennis: The Problem of Small Change 107
437) reports that the public immediately absorbed that ﬁrst lot of coins and
the government then requested that the Birmingham mint deliver the rest of
the coins as soon as possible. Both the small denomination of these copper
coins and their generalized acceptance by the public seem indicative of the
high level of unsatisﬁed demand for fractional money that existed during that
period.31
Paper Money
In June 1822 the government in BuenosAires gave a group of local business-
men an exclusive 20-year concession to create the ﬁrst (and only) bank in the
region. The Bank of Buenos Aires (also called Banco de Descuentos)w a s
supposed to be fully funded with private capital. Part of the government’s
justiﬁcation for allowing the creation of the Bank was the need to provide
appropriate means of payment to the community (Irigoin 2003, 65).32 Trade
liberalizationaftertherevolutionresultedinasubstantialincreaseincommer-
cialactivity, inturncreatingtheurgentneedformoredevelopedmonetaryand
ﬁnancial institutions in the region.
However, this was not the only motivation for the creation of the Bank.
In fact, there is some evidence indicating that the primary reason was to allow
the government to access cheaper ﬁnancing. By 1822 the government was
heavily involved in a civil war and was quickly running out of resources
(Prebisch 1921, 201). The plan was that the government would take loans
from the bank at preferential rates.
Some of the factors that triggered the creation of the Bank of Buenos
Aires seem indicative of the persistent shortage of low-denomination money.
First, from discussions at the time it is clear that private IOUs (vales) and
contrase˜ nas were still in circulation when the Bank was created in 1822 (El´ ıa
1942b, 323; Prebisch 1921, 199; Irigoin 2003, 65). The use of vales and
contrase˜ nas can be taken as evidence of the need for fractional money. To the
extent that parties in a transaction were willing to accept these very imperfect
meansofpayment,whichwereclearlyassociatedwithsigniﬁcantriskoffraud
Table 1). In other words, the gross revenue from the introduction of this ﬁrst batch of copper
coins in 1823 was about 2.5 percent of total annual tax revenue.
31 The circulation of token coins was never automatic in the early stages of monetary devel-
opment. It often happened that the population, accustomed to full-bodied coinage, distrusted the
validity of token copper coins as an acceptable means of payment. See Butlin (1953, 37) for the
case of Australia and Sargent and Velde (2002, 210) for the case of France in the 1590s (see also
footnote 13 in this paper). Of course, counterfeiting was always a potential problem in the case
of circulating token coins (see, for example, Sargent and Velde 2002, 217–18). The fact that these
ﬁrst copper coins were minted in England using frontier technology at the time probably reduced
the risk of counterfeiting making the coins more likely to circulate.
32 Redish (1984) reports that a similar justiﬁcation was used at the time of the creation of
the ﬁrst Canadian banks at the beginning of the 19th century.108 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
and counterfeiting, it must be the case that no better payment methods were
available (Prebisch 1921, 199).
Second, while initially the Bank of Buenos Aires was only allowed to
issue notes in denominations no lower than 20 hard pesos, in mid-1823 the
government agreed to authorize the Bank to start issuing lower-denomination
bills. ThesebillscametoreplacesomeTreasurynotesofsimilardenomination
that the Ministry of Finance had introduced only months before. The Bank
issued bills of one, three, and ﬁve hard pesos, convertible to gold and silver
coins upon presentation at the Bank’s window (El´ ıa 1942b, 326). While
these denominations were not, by any means, the lowest of the prevailing
structure, they were commonly used in domestic transactions. Also, they
were probably considered the natural intermediate step in the move toward
lower denominations.
During the ﬁrst two years of its existence, the Bank issued convertible
money notes well in excess of its reserves of gold and silver that resulted
in a conﬁdence crisis in 1825. Early in 1826, the Bank was taken over by
the government and its money notes were declared inconvertible. The notes
stayed in circulation but only based upon government ﬁat. The perceived
insufﬁciency of means of payment prevailing in the region was then replaced
byexcessiveprintingofinconvertiblepapermoney. Aregimeofhighinﬂation
followed, which lasted for many decades.33
3. FINAL REMARKS
In this article I reviewed evidence that suggests that shortages of small change
were a problem in the economy of the Rio de la Plata area during the colonial
period and the ﬁrst two decades after independence. Evidence of this sort is
already available for several other regions around the world. It is interesting
33After 1825 the authorities in both Bolivia and Buenos Aires started a period of sustained
monetary expansion and inﬂation (Irigoin 2003, 60). In Bolivia, the minting and systematic de-
basement of silver coins (moneda feble) was the main ﬁscal instrument of the new government.
These coins circulated also in the northwest regions of Argentina. In Buenos Aires, the govern-
ment printed large amounts of inconvertible paper money to ﬁnance increasing ﬁscal deﬁcits. The
paper peso depreciated around 200 percent during 1826 and continued depreciating in the follow-
ing years. For a detailed discussion of the monetary history of Argentina during this period, see
Irigoin (2003), Bordo and V´ egh (2002), and Irigoin (2000). In general, the paper money from
Buenos Aires did not circulate in the provinces. In the interior of the country, several provincial
governments attempted to issue their own paper money but faced substantial problems in inducing
its circulation, as the general population deeply mistrusted the viability of ﬁat money. In 1826 the
province of Corrientes issued 3,000 hard pesos in low-denomination notes, but acceptance was lim-
ited and the experiment became a complete failure (Irigoin 2003, 67). Sometimes the government
introduced extreme legislation to try to encourage the circulation of the money notes. For example,
in 1840 the provincial authority in Tucum´ an instituted the death penalty for those not accepting in
exchange the paper money printed by the Northern League, a coalition of northwestern provinces
(Halper´ ın Donghi 1979, 91).H. M. Ennis: The Problem of Small Change 109
to verify that a similar monetary phenomenon took place inArgentina during
the early stages of its political and economic development.
Several features made the evidence presented here especially interesting.
First, while most of the European evidence comes from economies where free
minting was in place, in Argentina during the late colonial period the supply
of coins was under the direct control of the Spanish Crown. Minting policies,
then, were not uniquely directed to improve the smooth functioning of the
monetary economy in the colonies. Spain was the main provider of high-
quality silver coins to the rest of Europe during that time. For this reason,
a major motivation for the Crown’s policies was to maintain an international
reputation of high quality for Spanish coins. These competing objectives
probablyincreasedthechancesofmisalignmentsbetweendemandandsupply
of denominations.
Second, the evidence clearly illustrates the interaction between money
and credit during the early stages of monetary development. To bypass the
problemofsmallchange,agentsintheeconomydevelopedrudimentarycredit
arrangements that allowed them to trade with one another. Two schemes were
prevalent. In one scheme, the buyer would extend credit to the seller through
the use of contrase˜ nas; in the other, the seller would grant credit to the buyers
by allowing them to accumulate a debit in a temporary account. It is a general
principleinmonetaryeconomicsthatmoneyandcreditactasclosesubstitutes.
In general, however, the emphasis has been on explaining how monetary ex-
change increases the trading possibilities in an economy where credit is not
always feasible (as in Kiyotaki and Wright 1993). The evidence presented
here highlights the reciprocal fact that when the convenience of monetary ex-
change is undermined by, in this case, the lack of small change, agents turn to
imperfect credit arrangements to carry out their economic transactions. (See
JinandTemzelides[2004]andCuadras-Morat´ o[2005]foraformaldiscussion
of some of these issues.)
Finally,itwasinterestingtoseethenewlycreatedgovernmentconfronting
all the basic economic issues involved in the provision of small change when
deciding to introduce copper coins. On one hand, effective fractional coins
needed to be of relatively high quality to avoid counterfeiting. On the other
hand, high-quality, low-denomination coins were very costly to produce. The
government realized that only a large scale of production could lower the
unitarycostofproductiontoanacceptablelevel. Thelackofsufﬁcientmineral
input delayed production of copper coins for several years. In the end, the
government resorted to importing the coins from England, an international
producer of coins for which scale of production was obviously not an issue.110 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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